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Public Access to Cable Television
The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech to promote the
free exchange of ideas that is vital to a democratic society.' If those
outside the mainstream of society are to be incorporated into a pluralis-
tic process, this exchange of ideas must include and reflect their ideas.
Mass media are the only effective vehicle for expression of opinions
representing diverse perspectives on public issues, including those of
individuals outside the mainstream.2 A high concentration of owner-
ship in the communications industry and a lack of public access to the
media, however, have discouraged individual participation in mass me-
dia communication.3 Privately owned media operated for profit often
lack incentive to broadcast the ideas of diverse groups of individuals.
4
With the advent of cable television, offering multichannel capacity
controlled by one cable operator, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) perceived a means of allowing individuals to participate
in public debate without substantial infringement of rights of private
owners of the media.5 The FCC promulgated regulations requiring
cable operators to leave a small percentage of their available channels
open for nondiscriminatory public access without any editorial control
by the operator, thus ensuring a degree of freedom of expression.
6
In 1979, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest 17),7 the
Supreme Court decided that the FCC had exceeded its authority by
promulgating these regulations.8 The Court held that the FCC's rules
were not "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's effective regula-
tion of television broadcasting, 9 and were thus beyond the statutory
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 371, 390
(1969).
2. Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standardfor Electronic and Print Media,
26 HASTINrS L.J. 659, 705 (1975).
3. See note 144 infra.
4. This result occurs although private ownership and a free exchange of ideas do not
inherently conflict. See notes 205-12 & accompanying text infra.
5. 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976); 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972); Barrow, The Fairness Doc-
trine: .4 Double Standardfor Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 693 (1975).
6. The current regulations are at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252-.256 (1980).
7. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
8. Id at 708. The regulations at issue were 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252, .254, and .256 (1980).
The regulations were formally rescinded by the FCC in 1980. 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980).
9. 440 U.S. at 708 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,
178 (1968)). The majority opinion was written by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice Stevens wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
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authority granted to the FCC by the Federal Communications Act of
1934.10
This Comment discusses the effect of Midwest II on the first
amendment protection of free speech. First, the Comment examines
the technology of cable systems and the history of its regulation. The
Comment then criticizes the Supreme Court's holding in Midwest II,
and contends that cable systems should not be analyzed under the same
criteria used to analyze the regulation of traditional broadcasting. Fi-
nally, the Comment argues that public access to cable systems should
be constitutionally protected and affirmatively promoted.
Development of Cable Television
Cable television, also called Community Antenna Television
(CATV), was developed in the late 1940's for use in communities un-
able to receive broadcast television signals because of rough terrain or
a too-distant location from television stations." Cable's capacity for
improving reception soon led to its introduction into cities. CATV sys-
tems deliver television signals by wire from a central transmission point
directly to the viewer's television.' 2 Unlike conventional television or
radio, at no point in the system are signals sent over the airwaves. The
signals are sent through cables or wires much like telephone
transmission. 13
Cable technology has expanded so that cable systems are now
ubiquitous and offer up to fifty-four channels.' 4 Recent bids have of-
10. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064-1115 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1976)).
11. Media Policy Session, Federal Trade Commission, Technology and Legal Change
17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Media Policy Session].
12. There are three basic sources for the signals: (1) local broadcasting station signals
received directly by a cable system antenna and transmitted along the cable, (2) local broad-
casting station signals received by an antenna close to the signal and transmitted through a
microwave connection over a long distance to the cable system, and (3) programs originat-
ing in the cable operator's own studio facilities. This last process is called cablecasting.
SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF
ABUNDANCE 15-16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SLOAN COMMISSION].
13. For a detailed description of cable technology, see SLOAN COMMISSION, suipra note
12, at 11-16.
14. Today, cable systems serve several different functions. In addition to the function
of retransmitting broadcast signals, cable operators produce, or originate, programs locally,
and most significantly, for an additional monthly fee cable operators provide subscribers
with access to services such as feature films, entertainment specials, and sporting events.
Known as "Pay TV," this latter service seems to be the main attraction for new cable sub-
scribers and is seen by the industry as one of the major growth areas in media. See Media
Policy Session, supra note 11, at 27-29. The discussion in this Comment, however, is focused
on the retransmission and cablecasting functions of cable systems because it is within these
functions that cable has its greatest potential for providing public access.
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fered 120-channel capacity. 15 This capacity sharply contrasts with the
one-channel capacity of a broadcast television station. In 1981, cable
systems represented a billion-dollar industry, with 4,400 operating
cable systems serving over twenty-two million subscribers-almost
twenty-eight percent of the total number of households with tele-
vision.16
The growth of cable's multichannel technology is leading to "a
communication revolution."1 7 As a cable system can simultaneously
retransmit existing broadcast signals and originate its own program-
ming, CATV has the ability to offer local and community services
along with national communication services. This capacity for provid-
ing diversity on its channels through specialized programming is en-
hanced by the fact that, unlike broadcast television, cable systems
derive their revenue directly from their audience through monthly
fees.18 The list of possible communications services that cable can pro-
vide is extensive 19 and expanding. These new technological abilities
and the capacity for providing an inexpensive but efficient forum for
local groups and diverse subjects contribute to the importance of cable
television's development. Broadcast television, while providing many
worthwhile services, has not sufficiently met the goals of providing di-
versity and a forum for local groups. 20
15. Media Policy Session, supra note 11, at 18. Most existing cable systems, however,
have a capacity of 12 channels or fewer.
16. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1981, § 3, at 4, col. 3.
17. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 2.
18. SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS REGULATORY PERFORMANCE,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (Staff Study 1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE Study].
19. Id.
20. See LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise ofProgramming Diversi y, 42 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 25, 31 n.34 (1973). For a detailed description of how CATV can be used to
encourage citizen participation, raise the level of culture, and provide education and services
to the public, see TALKING BACK: CITIZEN FEEDBACK & CABLE TECHNOLOGY (Ithiel de
Sola Pool ed. 1973).
Greater diversity in broadcast television could result from the FCC's proposal to au-
thorize new low-power television service. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: In the Matter of
an Inquiry into the Future Role of Low-Power Television Broadcasting and Television
Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,178 (1980) (pro-
posed Oct. 17, 1980) (printed in full at 82 F.C.C.2d 47 (1980)). The proposal allows televi-
sion translators-low-power broadcast stations that receive a television signal on one
channel, amplify it and transmit it on another channel--to conduct their own television
operations. The purpose of inaugurating these new television stations is to fill the unsatis-
fied demand for new television service, especially at the local level. 82 F.C.C.2d at 48, 55,
60. Low-power television is ideal for locally originated programming of specialized commu-
nity interest because of its low operating cost and technical simplicity in comparison to con-
ventional television. Id at 50, 80.
The low cost and the potential for reaching new audiences make low-power television
attractive to commercial groups as well as to nonprofit local organizations. A broadcaster
CABLE TELEVISIONMarch 1982]
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The Regulation of Cable Television
The Communications Act of 193421 is the foundation of the FCC's
jurisdiction over CATV. Essentially unchanged since its enactment,
the Act established a regulatory framework for communication by wire
and radio and created an agency, the FCC, which has control over all
forms of electrical communication. 22 As cable television did not exist
in 1934, the Act does not expressly provide for jurisdiction over cable
systems. Congress, however, intended to give the FCC authority over
all forms of communications technology.
23
During cable's early years, when cable was based almost exclu-
sively in small communities with poor broadcast reception, the only
means of regulating cable was through a local franchising process.
24
Local franchising continues today and requires that each cable opera-
tor obtain a community franchise granting authority to operate before
running cable through public streets to reach subscribers' homes. 25 The
power to demand a franchise enables communities to attach conditions
to the franchise grant or contract, thereby enabling the local governing
body to establish some control over the programming offered by the
cable system.26 One of the conditions that a community may attach to
that can obtain a network of low-power television stations can produce one type of program-
ming at one station and rebroadcast it to its other distant stations at a low cost, thus making
the venture profitable. Therefore, the competition for low-power television stations permits
has been fierce. See Access, Feb. 9, 1981, at 1, 3.
The FCC has not yet determined how to allocate these stations and has frozen applica-
tions for them; 5,000 were on file pending the completion of its rulemaking process. 87
F.C.C.2d 610, 611 (1981).
21. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
22. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168 (1968); 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1976): "For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges . . . there is created a commission to be
known as the 'Federal Communications Commission'. ...
23. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest II), 440 U.S. 689, 696 (1979); Communica-
tions Act of 1934, § 2(a), 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976): "The provisions of this chapter shall
apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio .. " Cable does not fit
into either category. It is, rather, a hybrid of radiowave broadcasting and wire com-
munications.
24. Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 685 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Barnett].
25. Id at 685. Local governments have a delegated power from the state to control the
use of streets. Id at 685 n.3; see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). In a majority of
states, local government controls the CATV franchising process. Albert, The Federal and
Local Regulation of Cable Television, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 508 (1977). Only 13 states
have cable regulatory agencies. 1981 BROADCASTING CABLE YEARBOOK A-35. Only three
states, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Rhode Island, have public access requirements. Access,
Feb. 23, 1981, at 8.
26. Barnett, supra note 24, at 685-86.
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a franchise agreement is a requirement that the cable operator permit
access to one or more of its channels by members of the public.
Before the FCC assumed regulation of cable, the power of locali-
ties to negotiate the franchise agreement often resulted in a lack of pro-
tection for the public with respect to the nature of the programming
offered by cable.27 The first comprehensive regulation of CATV oc-
curred in 1966.28 The regulations prevented CATV systems from ex-
panding into the markets of existing television stations and competing
with them without demonstrating that the expansion would serve the
public interest.
29
The FCC's authority to promulgate this complicated regulatory
scheme to restrict CATV and protect conventional broadcasting was
upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co. 30 The Court held that the FCC had the authority under section
2(1) of the Act to regulate cable, at least to the extent that such regula-
tion is "reasonably ancillary to the effective petformance of the Com-
mission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting."31 The Court expressly limited its holding by stating that
it expressed no view on the propriety of FCC regulation of cable for
reasons other than the reduction of cable's impact upon conventional
broadcasting.32
Soon after Southwestern, the FCC changed the emphasis of its reg-
ulation of cable from protecting broadcasting to promoting the public
interest through full utilization of the technological potential of cable.
33
The FCC decided that, because CATV systems can originate programs,
or cablecast, CATV had the potential "for increasing the number of
local outlets for community self-expression and for augmenting the
public's choice of programs and types of service, without use of broad-
27. Political scandals and favoritism in dealings between cable operators and local au-
thorities were common, and often there was neither competition for the franchise award nor
public notice of the franchise process. Id at 690-708.
28. Second Report and Order on Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Serv-
ice for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems, 2
F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). The FCC first assumed jurisdiction over CATV in 1962 when it de-
nied a microwave relay to a CATV system. In re Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32
F.C.C. 459 (1962), all'd., 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The
FCC reasoned that the importation of distant signals into the service area of a local televi-
sion station would cause that station to lose viewers, thereby diminishing advertising reve-
nue and possibly causing the station to go out of business. Id at 465.
-29. See LaPierre, Cable Television andthe Promise ofProgrammingDiversity, 42 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 25, 51-55 (1973).
30. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
31. Id at 178.
32. Id
33. The Commission wanted to obtain, "consistent with the public interest standard of
the Communications Act, the full benefits of developing [CATV] technology for the public
..... " Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
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cast spectrum. ' 34 Accordingly, the FCC adopted rules in 1969 requir-
ing a cable system having 3,500 or more subscribers to operate as a
local outlet by originating some of its own programs. 35 A cable system
that did not follow these rules could not carry the signal of any televi-
sion station.36
In 1971, Midwest Video Corporation, an operator of CATV sys-
tems, challenged the cablecasting requirements. The Eighth Circuit set
the regulations aside,37 but the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Cir-
cuit, upholding the rules in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Mid-
west I).38 In a split decision, the Court held that the program
origination rules met the "reasonably ancillary" standard enunciated in
Southwestern, and that the FCC could "regulate CATV with a view not
merely to protect but to promote the objectives for which the Commis-
sion had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting.
'39
Promulgating the Access Rules
Midwest I firmly established the FCC's authority to regulate cable
television. In 1972, the FCC issued a comprehensive set of regulations
34. Id. at 421.
35. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1970) (repealed 1974).
36. Id The rules had little effect because, first, at that time only 10% of all cable sys-
tems had 3,500 subscribers, and second, the rules were in constant suspension, that is, were
pending review, until their repeal in 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974) (formally rescinding
the mandatory origination rule). See LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise ofProgram-
ming Diversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 25, 85 (1973).
37. Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406
U.S. 649 (1972).
38. 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Other courts have interpreted the holding in Midwest I as
permitting rules that would encourage diversity in broadcasting. Based on Midwest I, the
Ninth Circuit explicitly approved the Commission's broad authority to promulgate the 1972
access rules in ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1351 (1975). The District of Columbia Circuit
assessed Midwest I in a similar manner in National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533
F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976), stating: "Since a prime purpose in the area of broadcast regula-
tion is the assurance of variety in what appears on the home viewer's screen . . . 'suitable
diversified programming' [on cable] is within the ancillariness standard [of United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)]." Id at 615 (footnotes omitted). The court in
NationaiAss'n ruled that there was no nexus shown between FCC preemption of regulation
of two-way nonvideo leased access cable channels and the program diversity goal. In
Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (1978), the Second Circuit approved FCC
preemption of price regulation for pay cable because it furthered the program diversity goal.
The FCC policy prohibited price restraints.
39. Id. at 667. The stated objectives stem from the Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)). See note 22
supra.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring, stated that the origination rule "strains the outer lim-
its of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the
Commission and the courts." 406 U.S. at 676. He called for congressional "comprehensive
reexamination of the statutory scheme" of the FCC in relation to CATV. He concluded,
however, that "until Congress acts, the Commission should be allowed wide latitude." Id
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that are the basis for the present rules regulating cable television.40 The
rules required inter alia that the cable systems in the top 100 cable mar-
kets dedicate four of their channels for public, governmental, educa-
tional, and leased access.
41
In 1976, the FCC issued an order modifying the 1972 rules42 to
ensure public access to cable systems of a designated size and to regu-
late the manner in which access was to be provided, including the
charges that could be assessed for such access by cable operators.
43
The rules, which applied only to cable systems with more than 3,500
subscribers, required that each system have a twenty-channel capacity
and capacity for two-way, nonvoice communications by 1986.44 Each
system was required to maintain four separate access channels-public,
governmental, educational, and leased-but, absent full-time demand,
the channels could be combined into one shared access channel.45 Ad-
ditionally, each cable system was required to make equipment avail-
able at a reasonable cost to those using the channels and at no charge
on the public access channel for programs not exceeding five minutes in
length.46 Systems operators could have no editorial control of the con-
tent of access programming, except that they could adopt rules pro-
scribing the transmission of obscene and indecent matter, lottery
information, and commercial matter.47 Furthermore, the regulations
instructed cable operators to offer access on the public and leased chan-
nels on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis.
4 8
The FCC expressed its rationale for the rules in terms of public
benefit:
[These channels of communication can,] if properly used, result in
the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in the promotion
of diversity in television programming, act in some measure to re-
store a sense of community to cable subscribers and a sense of open-
ness and participation to the video medium, aid in the functioning of
40. Cable Television Service; Cable Television Relay Service, 37 Fed. Reg. 3251
(1972), modfed, Cable Television Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 207 (1975) (extending
compliance deadlines from 1977 to 1986).
41. 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 240-41 (1972).
42. 1976 Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
43. Midwest II, 440 U.S. 689, 692 (1979).
44. Codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.252 (1980).
45. Codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1980).
46. Codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.256 (1980).
47. Id The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stayed the regulation requir-
ing promulgation of rules prohibiting the transmission of obscene and indecent material on
access channels in an order filed in ACLU v. FCC, No. 76-1695 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 1977)
(unpublished order); therefore, the rule was never put into effect. Today there is no obscen-
ity prohibition on access channels, although there is such a prohibition with respect to pro-
gramming over which the cable operator has editorial control. 47 C.F.R. § 76.215 (1980);
see 87 F.C.C.2d 40, 43 (1981).
48. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256 (1980).
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democratic institutions, and improve the informational and educa-
tional communications resources of cable television communities.
49
Industry Opposition to the Access Rules
Although the 1976 modifications relaxed the requirements of the
1972 rules, the cable industry had major objections to the access rules.50
Cable operators objected that the rules force common carrier obliga-
tions on cable operators in violation of section 3(h) of the 1934 Com-
munications Act5' and that they intrude on the first amendment rights
of cable operators.52 Deciding to promulgate the rules, the FCC re-
jected the operators' first argument, explaining that, because cable op-
erators are neither broadcasters nor common carriers, but are a
hybrid, 53 denominating the rules as common carrier in nature is imma-
terial as long as the rules promote the public interest statutory objec-
tives of the FCC.54  The FCC also rejected the second argument,
stating that the access rules promote "an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas" in lieu of the "monopolization of that market" by the govern-
ment, private broadcasters, or cable owners, 55 and thus the rules further
first amendment rights of the public to a greater extent than they im-
pair the first amendment rights of cable owners.
Judicial Opposition to the Access Rules: FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.
In 1977, Midwest Video Corporation (Midwest) and the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sought review of the 1976 order in Mid-
west 11.56 Midwest challenged the regulations as outside the jurisdic-
tion of the FCC and in violation of the free press clause of the first
amendment57 and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
58
The ACLU challenged the weakening of the regulations as an im-
proper retreat from the FCC's obligation to regulate cable, as exces-
49. 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976).
50. Id. at 297-98 (1976).
51. "[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so
engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h). For a discussion of the mean-
ing of common carrier, see text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
52. 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 298 (1976).
53. Each is regulated by a separate section of the Act. Common carriers are subject to
title II, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-223 (1976), while broadcasters are regulated by title III, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 301-389 (1976).
54. 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 299 (1976).
55. Id (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 371, 390 (1969)).
56. 571 F.2d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 1978), affid, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
57. 571 F.2d at 1029. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom. . . of
the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. 571 F.2d at 1029. "No person shall be. . deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
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sively harmful to the interests of access program producers, and as a
violation of the first amendment goals of diversity and freedom of
expression.5 9
The Eighth Circuit agreed with Midwest and held that the FCC
acted outside its jurisdiction when it imposed a limited form of com-
mon carrier access responsibilities on cable systems.60 As the Commu-
nications Act contained no specific grant of authority over cable
systems to the FCC to assert jurisdiction over the cablecasting function
of cable systems, the FCC had to equate "cablecast" with "broadcast"
under a "reasonably ancillary" theory.61 Therefore, the court held that
the access rules violated the statutory mandate that broadcasters may
not be treated as common carriers.
62
The Supreme Court upheld the Eighth Circuit, agreeing that the
rules impermissibly imposed common carrier obligations on cable op-
erators. 63 The Court concluded that the access rules imposed common
carrier obligations because they required cable operators to offer the
access channels on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis, prohibited the
operator from asserting any editorial control over content of access pro-
gramming, and limited the fee operators' charge for access and equip-
ment usage. 4
Section 3(h) of the Act defines a common carrier as "any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire .... -65 This definition has
been construed to mean that a communications operator is a common
carrier when it offers the use of its communications system to the public
on a nondiscriminatory basis and allows complete customer control
over the content of the communication. 66 Examples of communica-
tions common carriers are telephone and telegraph companies.6
7
For an interpretation of section 3(h), the Midwest II majority re-
lied on the 1973 case, Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee6" and stated that "Congress has restricted the
59. 571 F.2d at 1029.
60. Id at 1029, 1048-52. The court based its decision solely on jurisdictional grounds.
The opinion, however, does include a lengthy discussion of the constitutional issues, in
which Chief Judge Markey favors the position of Midwest. Id at 1052-59.
61. Id at 1037-40, 1051.
62. Id at 1051 & n.65.
63. Midwest II, 440 U.S. 689, 700-02 (1979). See note 51 supra.
64. id at 701-02.
65. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
66. 440 U.S. at 701; see National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601,
608 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Common Carriers Under the Communications Act,
48 U. CM. L. REV. 409 (1981) (analysis of judicial definitions of communication common
carriers).
67. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 221-222 (1976).
68. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The CBS case involved a complaint filed with the FCC by the
Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, alleging that a radio station had refused to
March 1982] CABLE TELEVISION
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Commission's ability to advance objectives associated with public ac-
cess at the expense of the journalistic freedom of persons engaged in
broadcasting." 69 The CBS Court had interpreted the 1934 Act as in-
tending that private broadcasting, with its limited spectrum space, "de-
velop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public
obligations. ' 70 The CBS Court determined that the Act's provision for
periodic license renewal proceedings, 7' granting the listening public an
opportunity to express its opinion about the quality of programming,
was sufficient to ensure that government power would be properly as-
serted within the framework of the Act "when the interests of the pub-
lic are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the
broadcasters.
72
In summary, by broadly interpreting section 3(h) of the 1934 Act,
the Midwest II Court struck down the access rules solely on a jurisdic-
tional basis. As the rules transferred control of some of the cable sys-
tem's channels from the system's owner, thus imposing a financial
burden, and as the rules abrogated control over the content of some of
its programming, thus imposing an editorial burden, the Court held
that the cable operator was being treated impermissibly as a common
sell it air time for editorial announcements, thereby violating the first amendment and the
Fairness Doctrine. The Fairness Doctrine obligates a broadcaster to allow a candidate for
public office to use its facilities, once the broadcaster has allowed an opposing candidate to
do so. It was originally enacted as § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170, and
later incorporated into the Communications Act by Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557, 557 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)). The Fairness doc-
trine is discussed at notes 211-17 & accompanying text infra. For a discussion of other
provisions of § 315(a), see notes 172-75 & accompanying text infra.
The Democratic National Committee joined, requesting a declaratory ruling from the
FCC that the first amendment and the Communications Act prohibit a broadcaster from
having a policy of refusing to sell air time to responsible entities that wish to present their
views on public issues. The Court ultimately held that broadcasters have a first amendment
right of editorial freedom and cannot be forced to accept editorial advertisements. 412 U.S.
94, 101-14 (1973). In analyzing the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, the precur-
sor of the Communications Act, the Court found that "Congress specifically dealt with-and
firmly rejected-the argument that the broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective
basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues." Id at 105.
69. 440 U.S. at 707.
70. 412 U.S. at 110.
71. Until 1981, broadcast licenses were issued or renewed for three-year periods. See
47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976). On July 31, 1981, Congress extended broadcast license periods to
five years for television and seven years for radio. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1241, 95 Stat. 357, 736.
72. 412 U.S. at 110. The CBS Court also quoted, as proof of congressional intent of
journalistic freedom, § 326 of the Act: "'Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or
construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promul-
gated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication.' "Id
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carrier.73 The Midwest 1I Court concluded that only Congress could
compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-
originated transmissions74 and that the FCC had exceeded its authority
under the 1934 Act.
The conclusion of the majority in Midwest II rests on three
grounds. First, the absence of a public access requirement within the
Act can be interpreted as reflecting a congressional intent to forbid
mandated public access to cable television. Second, broadcasting is
equivalent to cable television for purposes of the section 3(h) prohibi-
tion concerning common carriers. Third, the economic and editorial
burden imposed upon cable owners by the access rules is prohibited by
law. A critical analysis of these bases, however, reveals serious
problems with the Court's decision.
Congressional Intent
The CBS Court's interpretation of the congressional intent in 1927
and 1934 is inapplicable to regulation concerning cable television.
75
First, although each traditional broadcasting station has only one chan-
nel or wavelength, a cable operator has a large number of available
channels. A public access requirement might severely displace air time
available to the single-channel broadcaster for advertising, its primary
source of income. 76 The multichannel cable operator, faced with a re-
quirement that a given amount of time be available for public access,
would have ample time on other channels. Additionally, cable owners
receive the bulk of their revenue from monthly subscription fees, not
from advertising.77 Thus, as revenue-producing programming is not
essential to a cable system, there is little danger that displacement by
public access programming will substantially interfere with the
financial support of a cable system. The argument that "it is physically
impossible to provide time for all viewpoints"78 is not applicable to a
mass medium capable of providing virtually unlimited channel
capacity.7
9
73. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 700-01, 707-08 & n.17.
74. Id at 709.
75. The dissent in Midwest II argued that § 3(h) did not grant or deny the FCC any
substantive authority, but merely prohibited the automatic imposition of common carrier
status on every broadcasting station simply because the station is engaged in radio broad-
casting. Thus the FCC might still impose a requirement, even though that requirement
might be termed a "common carrier obligation." Id at 710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
dissent also argued that cable systems were outside of § 3(h) by their nature as cablecasters
rather than broadcasters. Id at 711 n.3.
76. See Note, The Invalidation ofMandatory Cable Access Regulation: FCC v. Midwest
Video Corp., 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 469, 486 (1980).
77. See Media Policy Session, supra note 11, at 27.
78. 412 U.S. at 111.
79. Note, FCC Regulation of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 204, 228 (1979).
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A second reason for finding the congressional intent regarding the
regulation of traditional broadcasting inapplicable to an analysis of
cable television is that the license renewal procedure, designed to en-
sure that the broadcaster will conform to its public interest obligations,
does not exist for cable systems. Instead, cable systems secure a
franchise from the local governing authority, and a franchise can ex-
tend for as long as twenty-five years.80 In addition, frequently the only
matter of renegotiation while the franchise exists is the amount of fees
paid to the municipality. Until recently, the FCC had minimum
franchise standards, but now state or local authorities, whose enforce-
ment powers are uncertain, prescribe most of the rules for the
franchise.8' Thus, there is no automatic, periodic review by a federal
agency to protect the public interest.
A third reason for distinguishing the applicability of the rationale
employed in CBS from the rationale that should be employed to ana-
lyze cable television regulation is that the CBS Court placed great em-
phasis on the adoption of section 326 of the Act, which prohibits FCC
censorship of or interference with free speech.82 In both CBS and Mid-
west II, the Court interpreted this section as evincing "Congress' fiat
refusal to impose a common carrier right of access for all persons wish-
ing to speak out on public issues."' 83 The Court thus suggested that
Congress preferred that the private broadcaster, rather than the govern-
ment, select whose voice should be heard.
The cable access rules at issue, however, do not contravene section
326. The rules merely require that some channel space be made avail-
able to the public, free from journalistic or governmental censorship.
84
In contrast to the CBS decision,8 5 the regulations would not require the
FCC to supervise the daily operations of a broadcaster's conduct: no
government regulation other than the initial promulgation of the rules
80. See, e.g., San Francisco, Cal. Ordinance 541-80 (Nov. 10, 1980) (amending Ordi-
nance 105-64) (granting Viacom Cablevision Co. a 25-year franchise).
81. For the remaining standards, which govern the amount of franchise fees, see 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.30, 76.31 (1980). An amendment to S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (enti-
tled the "Telecommunications Competition & Deregulation Act of 1981"), a bill deregulat-
ing most aspects of the telecommunications industry except basic telephone service, would
have prohibited any rate regulation of cable services. The amendment was deleted just
before the bill passed the Senate on Oct. 7, 1981, due to efforts by Communications Subcom-
mittee Chairman Barry Goldwater, who argued that the amendment had not received suffi-
cient consideration and had only been included in the bill because of "nefarious" deals by
cable industry lobbyists. Los Angeles Daily J., Oct. 7, 1981, at 7.
For a general discussion of franchising, see notes 126-49 & accompanying text infra.
82. 47 U.S.C. § 326. See note 72 supra for text of § 326.
83. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 704; CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110.
84. Although the rules required obscenity censorship, such censorship is not seen as an
imposition on broadcasters, and in fact these rules were never implemented. See note 47
supra.
85. 412 U.S. at 127.
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was required. The rules provided that no one would have control of
the content of the programming. Furthermore, journalistic freedom
would still be maintained on most of the cable system's channels. Sec-
tion 326 was conceived at a time of broadcast frequency scarcity and
thus would not prohibit public access rules today on a technologically
different medium on which there is no such scarcity.
The distinctions between traditional broadcasting media and cable
weaken any argument to support application of the congressional in-
tent of 1934 to regulation of cable television. Different media require
different standards for regulation. Therefore, Midwest IPs reliance on
CBS, which involves a different medium, is misplaced. The result of
relying upon CBS was that the Court in Midwest 11 failed to analyze
cable as a telecommunications technology with distinct characteristics.
Section 3(h)
The Midwest II Court relied on CBS for its interpretation of sec-
tion 3(h).8 6 A close analysis of section 3(h), however, indicates that the
Court's reliance on that provision and the Court's use of CBS as prece-
dent for its decision were misplaced.
Section 3(h) of the Act states that a person engaged in broadcast-
ing shall not be deemed a common carrier.87 Common carriers and
broadcasters are governed by different sections of the Act: Title II reg-
ulates common carriers8 and Title III regulates broadcasters.8 9 Sec-
tion 3(h) is definitional; it was included in the Act so that broadcasters
would not be regulated by the title that regulates common carriers, but
it was not intended to prevent the imposition of any type of common
carrier obligation.90 As it was merely definitional, section 3(h) was not
drafted as a denial of any substantive authority of the FCC.91
The majority, however, construed the section to deny the authority
of the FCC to impose public access requirements on broadcasters. 9
2
The majority then extended the application of section 3(h) to cable op-
erators because both broadcasters and cable operators have "a signifi-
cant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their programming
will include," 93 and the legislative history of section 3(h) indicates
"Congress' stern disapproval"94 of any negation of that editorial
discretion.
86. See notes 63-69 & accompanying text supra.
87. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
88. Id at §§ 201-223 (1976).
89. Id at §§ 301-386 (1976).
90. 440 U.S. at 710-11.
91. Id
92. Id at 705.
93. Id at 707.
94. .d at 708.
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This treatment, however, ignores the differences between broad-
casting and cable. Cable operators are not broadcasters, but "are en-
gaged in the distinct process of 'cablecasting.' "95 Unlike broadcasters
with one channel or station, cable operators operate multichannel sys-
tems, and thus, except on the small percentage of their channels de-
voted to public access, maintain their editorial discretion.
Additionally, cable operators do not make use of the broadcast spec-
trum 96 and so are not subject to Title III of the 1934 Act, which regu-
lates broadcasters. 97  Furthermore, cable systems act principally as
conduits of programming that has already been broadcast or transmit-
ted, and therefore cable operators ordinarily exercise little editorial
judgment in selecting programming. 98
Thus, the distinction between the operation of traditional one-
channel broadcasting and cable television indicates that the rationale
employed by the courts to prohibit imposing any common carrier obli-
gations on one-channel media such as television or radio is not applica-
ble to the regulation of multichannel cable systems.99 To the extent
that section 3(h) can be held to prohibit public access, this prohibition
should not be extended to the technically distinct medium of cable
television.
The Burdens Imposed by Requiring Public Access Channels
Editorial Burden
The Court in Midwest ! held that the FCC had exceeded its juris-
diction by promulgating the access rules.' ° One basis for the Court's
decision was that the FCC exceeded its authority when it deprived
cable operators of editorial discretion over access channels.' 0' The de-
gree of loss of editorial control over programming is negligible, how-
ever, because most cable operations involve the repetition of other
95. Id. at 711 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Teleprompter v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968) (cable sys-
tems are not broadcasters but are simply transmitters of broadcast material).
96. That is, the frequency spectrum over which broadcasters transmit signals.
97. Cf. ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1351 (9th Cir. 1975) (as neither Title II nor Title
III specifically addresses the problems of CATV, these restrictions do not apply). Nor are
cable operators subject to Title II. Id
98. Kreiss, Deregulation of Cable Television and the Problem of Access Under the First
Amendment, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1026 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kreiss].
99. This possibility was acknowledged in 1975 by the House of Representatives in a
staff study approving the FCC requirement of a local access and leased access channel. The
study, however, disapproved of imposing free educational and governmental channels be-
cause of the financial burden on the cable operator. HousE Study, supra note 18, at 73.
100. 440 U.S. at 708.
101. Id. at 711 n.3. This was the basis for the Court's decision that the outer limits had
been strained, but this holding was based on a questionable interpretation of the legislative
intent in promulgating § 3(h). See notes 75-85 & accompanying text supra.
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television signals, and the only decision made by cable operators is
whether to carry a particular signal. Only on local cablecast channels is
complete editorial control retained by the cable operator. 10 2 To many
authorities, the small burden of losing editorial discretion over the few
access channels is outweighed by the overall benefit to the public of the
access channels. 0 3
Economic Burden
The Court in Midwest II was not solely concerned with the edito-
rial burden imposed by the access rules. A further reason for its deci-
sion was the displacement of alternative programming and the
restrictions on expansion of other cable services that accompanied the
mandatory access rules. °4 The Court also suggested that the access
rules obligated cable operators to make equipment available to access
users at low or no cost 10 5 and that therefore a financial burden would
be inflicted upon cable operators by the imposition of mandatory ac-
cess rules.
In Midwest I, the Court upheld rules requiring cable operators to
produce or originate some of their own programming. 0 6 In Midwest
II, the Court struck down rules requiring cable operators to make
space available for others to produce programming. The argument that
the economic burden is a reason for invalidating the access rules, how-
ever, is specious; the financial burden on cable -operators created by
requiring public access is unlikely to be greater than the financial bur-
den created by requiring local origination.
In 1974, when both origination and access requirements were in
existence, the FCC, in considering whether to amend or eliminate the
mandatory origination requirement, requested comments about that re-
quirement from all interested parties. 0 7 The majority of responding
parties recommended that the rule be eliminated. One reason for this
recommendation was that the rule "diverted facilities, capital and per-
sonnel to the production of 'substandard' programming for which there
[was] no significant demand."'' 08 Other reasons included the programs'
difficulty in attracting advertisers'0 9 and in meeting the Fairness Doc-
102. See note 12 & accompanying text supra. Furthermore, cable systems are specifi-
cally forbidden by the Copyright Act of 1976 to edit any retransmitted programming. 17
U.S.C. § 11l(c)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
103. See notes 196-223 & accompanying text infra.
104. 440 U.S. at 707 n.17.
105. Id at 693-94.
106. 406 U.S. 649, 674-75 (1972).
107. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and of Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 139 (1974).
108. Report and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1094 (1974).
109. Id Locally originated programs do carry advertising. See note 165 & accompany-
ing text infra.
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trine requirement."Il 0
Most significantly, the cable operators requesting elimination of
the origination rules suggested that access channels were a less burden-
some way of accomplishing the FCC's goals.I'I The operators asserted
that providing equipment, as required by the access rules, was less ex-
pensive and less burdensome than the financial costs associated with
the local origination requirement."
12
As a result of these comments and because the FCC also believed
that the access rules were a less burdensome way to accomplish the
goals of diversity and community self-expression, the FCC eliminated
the mandatory origination rules while leaving in force the public access
rules. 113
Although the FCC had considered the question of the viability of
public access rules, the majority in Midwest 11 struck down these rules,
apparently ignoring the maxim of administrative law that a finding of
an administrative agency should be accorded significant weight.' ' 4 The
Court is not bound by administrative decisions such as the one made
by the FCC regarding the lesser cost of access programming,'-' but
"the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution
should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative
construction.""16 Thus, the determination by the FCC that the access
rules were less financially burdensome than the origination require-
ments should have carried much weight.
The economic burden of the access rules with which the Midwest
II Court was concerned could also have been alleviated if the FCC
110. Report and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d at 1096. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 371, 375-79 (1969). See notes 226-31 & accompanying text infra (explanation of
Fairness Doctrine).
111. 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1095-96 (1974).
112. Id at 1100.
113. 440 U.S. at 709 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The FCC's rationale for eliminating the
origination rules was as follows: "Quality, effective, local programming demands creativity
and interest. These factors cannot be mandated by law or contract. The net effect of at-
tempting to require origination has been the expenditure of large amounts of money for
programming that was, in many instances, neither wanted by subscribers nor beneficial to
the system's total operation. In those cases in which the operator showed an interest or the
cable community showed a desire for local programming, an outlet for local expression be-
gan to develop, regardless of specific legal requirements." 49 F.C.C.2d at 1105.
114. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965).
115. See Note, FCC v. Midwest Video Corporation: One Less Cable Restraint, 41 OHIO
STATE L.J. 575, 580 (1979).
116. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 381; see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. at 11-12; Francis Biddle Lecture by Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals at Harvard Law School (Oct. 16, 1979), reprinted in 15 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1980) (courts should do no more than keep administrative agencies
within constitutional bounds).
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had followed the implementation of the rules. The FCC has followed a
consistent policy of relaxing its rules when they might cause undue eco-
nomic hardship." 7 Thus, it seems illogical to use the rationale of im-
permissible economic burden to strike down the less burdensome
access rules.
The Midwest ! Court's reliance upon the Communications Act of
1934 and its underlying congressional intent to prohibit mandatory
public access to cable television was not well founded. Nor do the
editorial and financial burdens imposed on cable operators by access
requirements seem sufficiently oppressive to have warranted the invali-
dation of the access rules. Other factors indicate that access rules such
as the ones invalidated in Midwest 1 are desirable.
A Need for Regulation
Statutory Goals
In Midwest 1, the local origination rules were upheld as serving the
FCC's statutory goals of establishing more outlets for community ex-
pression and increasing the diversity of programming."18 The attain-
ment of these same goals should be sufficient to support the access
rules. In Southwestern and Midwest !, the Court recognized the need to
give the FCC sufficient latitude to cope with technological develop-
ments in the rapidly changing field of television media.' 1 9 The rules
struck down in Midwest !! are a logical extension of the authority given
to the FCC to regulate the communications industry. 120 An outdated
117. The original access rules required the larger cable systems to develop 20-channel
capacity, with four of those channels reserved for public access. Realizing the financial bur-
den involved, the FCC amended the rules in 1976 to make them less onerous. Report and
Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). These changes extended the compliance deadline until 1986
and provided that, until public demand existed, the cable operator could meet the access
requirement by providing fewer than four channels. The modification also limited the ap-
plication of the rules to cable systems having 3,500 or more subscribers. Id The modified
rules are located at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252-.256 (1980). Furthermore, in 1978, the FCC deter-
mined that the rules did not require cable operators to provide live cablecasting when taping
facilities were made available to access users. In re Teleprompter of Worcester, Inc., 67
F.C.C.2d 643, 648 (1978). The amended version of the access rules seemed less financially
burdensome than the local origination rules, which were upheld in Midwest I.
118. 406 U.S. at 668-70. Until Midwest II, the Supreme Court and the majority of the
courts of appeals had approved FCC regulations, such as mandatory access, as furthering
the goal of increasing program diversity. See cases cited note 38 supra. Midwest 1I is a
reversal of this approval policy.
119. Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 27-28 (1977) (interpreting Southwestern
and Midwest 1).
120. The CBS Court had previously recognized the possibility of future access require-
ments when it stated: "Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission--or
the broadcasters-may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable
and desirable. Indeed, the Commission noted in these proceedings that the advent of cable
television will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues. In its pro-
CABLE TELEVISIONMarch 1982]
classification of modern technology should not be used to abrogate that
authority. 
12'
Future Demand for Access
One argument against mandatory access rules is that there is no
demand for public access to cable television. 122 This argument ignores
the fact that there will be little demand for access as long as the public
is ignorant of the opportunity for access. In addition, as more homes
are wired for cable, public awareness and public demand for access to a
cable channel will increase. When that happens, the burden imposed
on the cable operator will be much greater if it is forced by the public
or the courts to eliminate programming already developed to make
channels available for public use.12 3 Many franchises run for as long as
posed rules on cable television the Commission has provided that cable systems in major
television markets 'shall maintain at least one specially designated, noncommercial public
access channel available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. The system shall main-
tain and have available for public use at least the minimal equipment and facilities neces-
sary for the production of programming for such a channel.'" 412 U.S. at 131 (quoting 37
Fed. Reg. 3289, 76.251 (a)(4)). Thus, in 1972 the Court found nothing wrong with the rules it
subsequently voided in 1979.
Additionally, in Red Lion the Court recognized "the legitimate claims of those unable
without governmental assistance to gain access to [broadcast] frequencies for expression of
their views ...." 395 U.S. at 400 (upholding the Fairness Doctrine).
121. One major reason for the Midwest II Court's decision may have been its desire to
spur Congress to take action on the issue after 45 years of congressional inaction. The Court
ended its opinion with an admonition that it was up to Congress to pass new legislation for
public access regulations to be valid. 440 U.S. at 709.
A number of bills have been introduced recently to amend the Communications Act.
On October 7, 1981, the Senate passed a bill that would initiate deregulation in most seg-
ments of the telecommunications industry. S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). An amend-
ment deregulating CATV rates was abandoned. Broadcasting, Oct. 12, 1981, at 27. The
House held hearings on the matter in September, but no action is expected until the summer
of 1982. Broadcasting, Sept. 21, 1981, at 52. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 4, 1981, § 1, at
12.
The FCC apparently favors deregulation. Radio was deregulated in the fields of
nonentertainment programming, commercialization and other areas in January 1981. Re-
port and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981). FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler has made speeches
in support of deregulation of broadcasting. Broadcasting, Sept. 28, 1981, at 19. Moreover,
the FCC has urged Congress to repeal the Fairness Doctrine and to change the general
purposes of the Communications Act to rely on "relevant marketplace forces" to determine
the availability of communications services to the public. Broadcasting, Sept. 21, 1981, at
23. Arguably, deregulation of cable will not be in the public interest. HousE Study, supra
note 18, at 5-6; SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 5-8; Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine."A
Double Standardfor Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 702-05, 708 (1975);
see also Media Policy Session, supra note 11, at 20-21. This might leave access in the hands
of those who can afford to pay for it, a situation that the Supreme Court has viewed with
disfavor. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 123; Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 392.
122. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1062 n.87 (8th Cir. 1978).
123. Not all available channel space is utilized at this point in the development of cable.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
twenty-five years,124 and in that period a cable operator might activate
all of its channels. Today, all that is required for the cable operator to
make a channel available for public access is to open up an unused
channel. 2 5 Thus, it is best to require the reservation of access channels
upon the grant of a franchise, even if current demand for an access
channel is not great.
Franchising Problems
Cable systems operate pursuant to a franchise that grants the cable
operator authority to construct and operate its system within a defined
area for a prescribed period of time. 26 The franchising authority is a
municipality that can negotiate for the services it desires from the cable
operator. 127
For several reasons, however, the local governing authority fre-
quently lacks the resources or ability to regulate the ongoing operations
of a cable operator effectively. Franchises are generally in the form of
contracts, not ordinances, and so cannot be unilaterally revoked by the
municipality. After a franchise has been granted, therefore, municipal-
ities lose most of their bargaining power and much of their ability to
regulate the operation of the cable operator unless the franchising au-
thority had the foresight to include certain adjustment clauses in the
contract. 28 Moreover, after the execution of a franchise agreement, the
local government often lacks the opportunity or expertise to monitor
the cable operator, even when participation by local officials is included
in the contract.'
29
In 1972, the FCC issued a set of cable regulations that included
minimum standards that localities had to maintain during the franchis-
ing process.' 30 These standards concerned the areas of public proceed-
ings, construction timetables, franchise duration, installation and
Thus, institutionalizing access channel requirements now does not take away any revenue-
producing channels from the operator. Forced preemption of operating channels when
there is more demand for access in the future would probably result in litigation by cable
operators.
124. See note 80 sufpra.
125. See note 123 supra.
126. See generally W. BAER & M. BOTEIN, CABLE TELEVISION: FRANCHISING CONSID-
ERATIONS (1974).
127. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
128. Barnett, supra note 24, at 699; M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 237 (1979). Pro-
fessor Hamburg includes in his book a sample franchise agreement supplied by Viacom
International, Inc., one of the largest cable operators and an offshoot of CBS. The agree-
ment does not mention any public access channels or local programming, thus illustrating
that a cable operator will not supply any public services it is not forced to supply. Id at 334-
48.
129. Barnett, supra note 24, at 698-700; M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 237 (1979).
130. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 141 (1972).
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subscription rates, compliance procedures, and franchise fees.13' The
1972 order also included the public access and local origination
rules, 32 which assumed control of the entire field of regulation of ac-
cess by requiring municipalities to follow the federal rules on the sub-
ject. 133 These rules were partially a response to municipal abuse of the
negotiation of franchise agreements 134 and were designed to ensure the
development of cable television in the public interest.
35
The origination rules were repealed in 1974,136 however, and the
public access rules were struck down in Midwest HI; therefore, there is
no longer any federal regulation in these areas. Furthermore, in 1977,
all the franchising standards, except for the minimum fee rule, were
changed to "non-mandatory guidelines."'' 37 Cable operators are no
longer required to file a statement with the FCC "explaining how the
system's franchise is consistent with Federal standards."' 38 Deregula-
tion by the FCC thus has left municipalities substantially alone in deal-
ing with cable operators. The status of regulation of cable television
has regressed to pre-FCC days, when local authorities dealt with cable
operators in the absence of federal guidance and subject only to mini-
mal federal regulations.
39
The demise of the access channel rules and the general deregula-
tion of many aspects of cable, however, have some benefits. Without
federal regulation, state and local governments are free to promulgate
131. Id. at 171-87.
132. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
133. See W. BAER & M. BOTEIN, CABLE TELEVISION: FRANCHISING CONSIDERATIONS
262 (1974).
134. Local authorities had often considered the franchising process as one of ensuring
new revenues for the municipality, and not of securing state-of-the-art services for the com-
munity. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 152.
135. See S. RIVKIN, A NEW GUIDE TO FEDERAL CABLE REGULATIONS (1978) (overview
of the rules as of 1977).
136. See note 36 supra.
137. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1980) (codifying 42 Fed. Reg. 52,416 (1977)).
138. 42 Fed. Reg. 52,405 (1977). These statements, called certificates of compliance, 47
C.F.R. § 76.11 (1978), were required until 1978, when they were replaced by registration
statements. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (1978). The registration statements require little of sub-
stance. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.12 (1979).
139. Most aspects of cable have been deregulated. The remaining rules are contained in
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617 (1980). In 1980, many of the remaining rules were deleted, including
§§ 76.151-.161 (distant signal carriage and program exclusivity, 79 F.C.C.2d 652 (1980)) and
§§ 76.252-.258 (channel capacity and access channels, 83 F.C.C.2d 147 (1980)). See gener-
aly Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation ofCable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
76 (1981).
Today, however, the public is more aware of what cable has to offer, and there are
numerous media reform groups to which a city can turn for guidance. A directory of such
groups is available from the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, located in
Washington, D.C.
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their own rules and to negotiate their own terms for cable franchises. 14
As the demand for cable has become so great,' 4 ' access is now an item
to be bid upon, and a cable operator that offers little access may have a
franchise bid rejected in favor of a bid from another operator offering
more access. Municipalities usually can obtain favorable terms in a
franchise agreement from the operator, because city cable franchises
now have become a lucrative investment for operators.
" Municipalities, however, often may be unable to extract adequate
assurances from a cable operator about public access' 42 because munic-
ipal authorities may be ignorant of the issues surrounding access and
the technology of cable television, and ask for too little in return for a
franchise. 43 Municipalities might prefer to collect revenues from the
franchise fee-usually five percent of gross receipts-rather than to in-
sist on access for their citizens. Moreover, ownership within the cable
industry is so concentrated' 44 that "it may be impossible for cities to
deal with operators in any manner approaching parity,"' 45 and thus the
140. One new rule is CAL. GovT. CODE § 53066.1 (West 1981). Passed in September
1979, it deregulates the rates a cable operator may charge if the system provides a commu-
nity services channel program. The California law provides more access and access-related
services than the FCC rules provided, but is completely voluntary on the part of the cable
operator.
141. Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 76, 110 (1981).
142. For an informative guide, see Owens, he Cable Franchising Process: Caveat
Emptor, Access, March 10, 1980, at I. If a franchisor follows the rules provided there, it is
likely that the best possible public access service will result. Another guide for local officials
is M. BOTEIN & B. PARK, WHAT TO Do WHEN CABLE COMES TO TOWN: A HANDBOOK FOR
LOCAL OFFICIALS (1980) (published by the Communications Media Center of the New York
Law School). Other similar guides have recently become available.
Even when public access service is obtained, it is not guaranteed to be permanent.
There is a growing tendency for franchise applicants to offer extensive packages to obtain
the potentially lucrative franchise. If the franchise proves to be unprofitable, however, it is
possible that local authorities will be faced with having to accept either a reduction in serv-
ices or an increase in the rates charged by the cable operator. If there is a reduction, it is
probable that the unremunerative services such as public access will be the first to be elimi-
nated. Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 76, 121 (1981).
143. "[A] city unprepared for a whirlwind promotional campaign by a skilled national
organization may well find itself unable ... to resist accepting a cable industry prepared
franchise." R. JACOBSON, MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF CABLS COMMUNICATIONS 35 (1977).
144. Id As of 1979, 26% of all cable households were served by the five largest cable
companies, while the top 25 served 54% of all subscribers. The largest company, Tele-
prompter, owns 110 cable systems, serving 1.1 million subscribers, or approximately nine
percent of all United States cable subscribers; see Media Policy Session, supra note 11, at 23.
Joint ventures in newer cable services are increasing between cable operators, the networks,
and even AT&T, thereby paving the road to greater concentration in the communications
industry. See also Broadcasting, Sept. 28, 1981, at 2.
145. R. JACOBSON, MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 39 (1977). Mr.
Jacobson advocates municipal ownership and operation of a cable system as the best way to
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community might reject any rights of access for its citizens in return for
guaranteed revenue from a cable operator.
Cable operators at times have improperly pressured municipalities
in order to secure franchise agreements. 146 Many franchise agreements
are negotiated by unqualified local officials, a fact indicating that a de-
gree of federal regulation of cable television is desirable. Even if a lo-
cal authority can effectively negotiate, the authority may place
economic benefit ahead of the public interest to access.
It has been suggested that the first amendment seeks "to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately pre-
vail, rather than to countenance a monopolization of that market."
1 47
With this purpose, it may not be desirable to leave the availability of
access to the media in the hands of the owners of the media. Although
state and local governments now have the power to demand public ac-
cess channels, they have shown little interest in promoting access. 148
To ensure adequate public access to the media, national standards and
policies for the regulation of cable television are needed to guide state
and local governments and to keep pace with developments in
technology. 
149
The Constitution and a Right of Access
The demise of the federal access rules has caused a relaxation of
the requirement that CATV provide outlets for community expression.
If a constitutional right of access to the media exists to promote the
goal of free speech, CATV is the forum in which this goal can best be
achieved. This is because cable is new and developing, it has an abun-
obtain all of the benefits of cable, including access. Id. at 41. There were 35 municipal cable
systems in operation as of May 1981. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1981, § A, at 14, col. 1. Another
alternative to the commercial operations is to form cable cooperatives with community
members buying a share. The first such publicly controlled cable system is being initiated in
St. Paul, Minnesota. Id
146. Prominent citizens may be employed as lobbyists. Newsweek, Aug. 4, 1980, at 44-
45; Access, June 1, 1981, at 4. In addition, there have been charges that cable operators have
bribed local officials. Id
147. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 389; see also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
148. Botein & Rice, Midwest Video: New Directionsfor Cable?, Access, Apr. 23, 1979, at
1.
149. The National League of Cities has recently developed a model "code of good con-
duct" for cable television franchising. The code stresses citizen involvement, lobbying re-
strictions, and financial disclosure by cable companies, city officials, and consultants.
Prepared without consultation with the cable industry, the code might lead to the wresting of
more public interest concessions, such as access channels, from cable operators, and might
increase the interest and awareness of city officials in the potential of cable. House Study,
supra note 18, at 106.
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dance of available channels, access presents no major technological or
financial problems, and excessive regulation is not necessary to meet a
mandatory access requirement. The question remains whether the first
amendment forbids the enforcement of unlimited public access require-
ments because enforcement would infringe on the freedom of the press
of the cable operators, or whether there is a public right to exercise
freedom of speech on cable television.
Possible Constitutional Impediments to the Right of Access
Although it recognized that the question was not frivolous, the
Supreme Court did not discuss the first amendment aspects of the ac-
cess rules in Midwest 11.150 The court of appeals, although also decid-
ing the case on statutory grounds, discussed at some length the
constitutional issue involved and concluded in dicta that the access
rules violated the first amendment rights of cable operators by wresting
control of privately owned communication facilities from them.151
The premise that the government could not interfere with the op-
eration of cable because cable systems are privately owned led to an
inadequate first amendment analysis by the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth
Circuit stated that the main issue was "the risk of an enlargement of
Government control over the content of [cablecast] discussion of public
issues."' 152 This conclusion is spurious, however, because the cable ac-
cess rules were content-free. They merely required that channels be
left open and did not prescribe who could talk and what could be
said.153
The Eighth Circuit opinion failed to analyze adequately the dis-
tinction between broadcasting, cable, and newspapers as communica-
tions media. This distinction is important with respect to the amount of
editorial control that the first amendment permits the owner to
retain.1
54
The contrast between broadcasting and cable in physical and eco-
nomic terms is so great that in many ways cable is more like newsprint
in the context of access requirements. The principal similarity is that
150. 440 U.S. at 709 n.19.
151. 571 F.2d at 1053-59. In its brief to the Court, the FCC failed to make any effort to
show that the access rules did not violate the first amendment rights of cable operators, but
instead merely restated its program diversity objective and resorted to the language of previ-
ous cases.
152. Id at 1054 (emphasis added).
153. There is no content focus except the aforementioned advertising and lottery prohi-
bition, which attempts to keep the access channels noncommercial. The obscenity prohibi-
tion was abandoned long before this case. See note 47 supra.
154. "[D]ifferences in the characteristics of the news media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at
386; see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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both cable and newsprint have a theoretical abundance of space for
diverse viewpoints. The Eighth Circuit in Midwest II concluded that,
under the first amendment, there is no distinction between newsprint
and cable. 155 Thus, because in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo156 the Supreme Court had held that there was no constitu-
tional right of access to newspapers, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
there was no such right for cable either.
In Miami Herald, the Supreme Court held that a Florida statute
establishing a right to reply to newspaper editorial attacks upon polit-
ical candidates violated the first amendment right of editorial auton-
omy for newspapers. Although sympathetic to access rights, 157 the
Court held that freedom of the press was paramount, that the press was
autonomous, and that it therefore could not be regulated. 158 The only
reasons given for the decision were the chilling effect enforced access
would have, 159 and a first amendment prohibition of regulation of edi-
torial decisions. 160 Miami Herald thus left newspapers free of access
obligations, while leaving intact the guarantee of limited access to radio
and television.'
6 1
An analysis of cable, however, shows that it differs from the news-
print media in many ways that enable public access to be enforced
without infringing on constitutional rights. First, newspapers usually
have an editorial policy that is an important influence upon content
and that receives the most first amendment attention. 162 In contrast, a
cable television station usually has no editorial policy, but broadcasts
merely to entertain. Sports, recently released movies, and, where re-
ception is poor, popular network programs, are its major offerings.
Any self-generated political commentary or news programming, other
than automated ticker tapes or national news network programs, is in-
155. 571 F.2d at 1056.
156. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
157. Id at 247-54.
158. Id at 256. As one commentator noted, "[T]he opinion offers virtually no reason for
its result [apart from constitutional platitudes] and does not even mention the five-year old
Red Lion decision," which had upheld access requirements for the electronic media. B.
SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SCHMIDT].
159. 418 U.S. at 257. "Government enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate .... "' Id
160. Id at 258. Professor Schmidt notes that the decision was handed down at the very
end of the 1974 Term and that the Court might have felt rushed, especially because Nixon v.
United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), was about to come before the Court. This might have
led the Court to treat "the problem of access in a general and truncated fashion." SCHMIDT,
supra note 158, at 235.
161. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748 (1978).
162. "A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment and
advertising," and thus the functions of its editors deserve first amendment protection.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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cidental and unusual. 63 Furthermore, cable depends on broadcast sig-
nals for the major portion of its programming' 64 and thus makes no
editorial decision about the content of the programs received on these
signals; it merely decides which programs to offer.
Second, the source of revenue differs for each type of medium.
Newspapers depend largely on advertising as a source of revenue. The
more newspapers sold, the more the owner can charge for advertising
space. Additionally, advertisers can withdraw their ads if they do not
like what is being printed. Cable, on the other hand, derives its reve-
nues primarily from monthly subscription fees. The average cable sys-
tem derives less than five percent of its revenue from advertising.
165
The concerns of newspaper publishers about advertisers do not apply
to cable.
166
Third, television intrudes into homes in a much stronger and more
pervasive manner than printed materials. Many recognize television,
including cable, as the most powerful medium of speech. 167 The
Supreme Court has recognized this influence as a justification for treat-
ing broadcasting differently from print under the first amendment.
68
Television provides the opportunity to bring information and ideas to
persons without much effort on the part of the viewer. The television
medium "may be the preeminent forum for the discussion of ideas and
viewpoints in the society."' 169 If this is so, messages delivered on cable
163. National news services such as the Cable News Network are transmitted to the
local cable operator, usually by satellite, and thus the local operator has no editorial control
over them. See note 189 & accompanying text infra. One of the purposes of public access is
to provide more local news programming-especially to special interest groups whose news
and information are deemed too insignificant for the mass appeal required for broadcast
television.
164. Midwest I, 406 U.S. 649, 675-76 (1972); SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 51.
165. Media Policy Session, supra note 11, at 25.
166. In the past few years, national cable programs, transmitted by satellite, have devel-
oped. Some of these are supported by advertising. In addition, the advertising revenues of
many cable operators may rise in the future. If this occurs, the source-of-revenue difference
between cable and newspapers will be lessened. The advertising, however, would not be on
public access channels, but on channels transmitting national programs. National advertis-
ers are unlikely to be concerned with the content of local public access channels. See Media
Policy Session, supra note 11, at 25-26.
167. M. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 308-37 (1964); Bazelon, FCC Regulation
ofthe Telecommunication Press, 1975 DuKE L.J. 213, 220-21 (1975); Bollinger, Freedom of
the Press and Public Access, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1976). "Not only does virtually
everyone have access to a television set, but more people watch it, even for purposes of
obtaining news, and for longer periods, than read the publications of the print media." Id at
13 (citing E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 9 (1973)).
168. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748.
169. Bollinger, Freedom ofthe Press and Public Access, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14 (1976).
Bollinger and others doubt that television shapes attitudes and ideas in much stronger ways
than newspapers. See, eg., id. at 15; Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility ofthe Broadcaster, 85
HARV. L. REv. 768, 769-70 (1972). This view presupposes that television and print media
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television may have more effect than messages delivered in the print
medium.170 As the impact of cable television becomes more pervasive,
it may be argued that the views expressed over cable should be more
diverse. 171
Finally, unlike newsprint, cable systems must obtain government
cooperation to obtain a franchise because they operate within the pub-
lic domain. 172 Cable operators require authorization to use the public
streets to lay their cables or to string them along telephone lines. This
authorization, or franchise, is usually exclusive and protects the cable
operator from potential competition, a privileged position not granted
to newspapers. 173 This dependence on public authorities is in sharp
contrast to the almost complete independence of regulation enjoyed by
the print media. Thus, because it enjoys a unique position in the com-
munity as a result of local government approval, the government does
not violate the first amendment by imposing access obligations on the
operator. 1
74
The qualitative differences between cable and newspapers require
that a different first amendment standard should apply to them. 75 The
Miami Herald prohibition against mandatory access should not be
transferred automatically from newspapers to cable.
Taking Under the Fifth Amendment
Midwest argued, and the Eighth Circuit agreed, that the access
rules constituted a taking of private property without just compensation
in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 176 Con-
cerned that cable operators would be forced to build facilities and to
dedicate them to the public, 177 the Eighth Circuit stated that the right
to own property "is a most fundamental right, the alleged deprivation
reach the public in relatively equal force. Yet there may be a large segment of the popula-
tion that is unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the print media or even illiterate and that
therefore relies on television, broadcast or cable, as the primary means of receiving informa-
tion. See SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 4.
170. See Bazelon, FCC Regulation ofthe Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213,
220.
171. The first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
172. Note, FCC Regulation of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204, 232 (1979).
173. Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 972
(1972).
174. See notes 196-201 & accompanying text infra.
175. See Note, FCC Regulation of Cable Television, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 204, 231 (1979).
176. 571 F.2d at 1057-58. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
177. 571 F.2d at 1058.
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of which cannot be ignored because that right was found uninfringed,
or overtaken by the public interest. .... ,178
The taking argument, however, is not a sufficient justification for
striking down the access rules. The question whether a public regula-
tion interfering with private property calls for compensation principally
depends on the magnitude of the taking.' 79 The Supreme Court re-
cently held in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 180 that
New York could restrict the use of privately owned historical buildings,
pursuant to its Landmarks Preservation Law, without effecting a tak-
ing, although the law caused the owner to suffer a loss of income.
Among the bases for the Court's decision that the law did not constitute
a taking requiring just compensation were: (1) the interference with
ownership rights was a "public program adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good. . . and the gen-
eral welfare"; 18 (2) the owner was not denied all use of airspace above
its building; 182 and (3) the law did not prevent the owner from making
a profit and obtaining a reasonable return on its investment.
183
Under this analysis, the access rules should not be held to .consti-
tute a taking. The rules were enacted to promote the public good and
the general welfare by furthering first amendment values. On balance,
the minimal economic burden on the cable operator is justified. The
economic burden can also be justified as part of the benefit of using the
public streets for its cables and for the privilege of securing a govern-
ment-granted monopoly.' 84 In addition, the cable operator would still
have the use of most of its channels for commercial purposes if access
were required.
185
In light of this reasoning, the fifth amendment taking argument
178. Id
179. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415-16 (1922).
180. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
181. Id at 123, 138.
182. Id at 136-37.
183. Id at 136.
184. See Note, Media and the First.4mendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 977
(1973). See notes 125-26 & accompanying text supra.
185. The rules required a maximum of four out of 20 channels for public access, allowed
combining access on one channel until there was a full time demand for more channels, and,
in the case of systems in operation before the promulgation of the rules, allowed combining
access programming with operator-designated programming on the same channel if demand
were low and activated channel capacity were insufficient. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a), (b), (c)
(1980).
Moreover, the compliance deadline for attaining 20-channel capacity is not until 1986.
By that time, most operators probably will have reached that capacity on their own by re-
placing old equipment and meeting the demand for new programming. Nearly all new sys-
tems have a capacity of at least 20 channels. Media Policy Session, supra note 11, at 18.
Unlimited numbers are predicted for the future. Note, The Invalidation of Mandatory Cable
Access Regulations: FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 469, 486 (1980).
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should not be persuasive in deciding the constitutionality of the access
rules. The Eighth Circuit's constitutional opposition to the access rules
is based on an insufficient analysis of the first and fifth amendment
rights involved in the issue.
Regulation of Content
Another potential constitutional hurdle to the enactment of regula-
tions that mandate access to cable facilities is that the access rules
might be said to control impermissibly the content of communication.
"[T]he government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas."' 86 The Supreme Court has consistently held that the govern-
ment cannot restrict speech because of its message, subject matter, or
content. 
87
This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the cable access
rules struck down in Midwest II are content-free. The rules merely
require that the cable operator make air time available, and allow the
operator "no control over the content of access cablecast programs."1
88
In addition, on the channels not used for access, the cable operator
retains complete autonomy over content. Thus, the access rules
presented no unconstitutional regulation of the content of speech.
On balance, the burden on the operators is not heavy enough to
outweigh the importance to the public of having access to a medium of
free expression. In addition, neither the minimal infringement on edi-
torial discretion nor the slight economic burden imposed by the access
regulations 89 on the operator should justify a refusal of access to a
small percentage of the available channels. As the operator retains
control over most of its channels, the freedom of press is not impaired.
Even if a right to access is granted, the cable operator has the opportu-
nity to exercise its editorial discretion with respect to the large majority
of its channels.
Regulation of Cable as a Conduit for Other Speakers
Another potential argument that requiring access on cable televi-
sion is unconstitutional, implicit in the foregoing arguments, is that
freedom of speech prohibits the forced expression of a "public" view-
point inconsistent with that of the cable operator. The freedom of ex-
186. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 745-46; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-58; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 396; see also
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) (prohibiting
radio censorship). See note 72 supra. For a further discussion of § 326 and the content-free
aspect of cable, see text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
187. Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
188. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(b). See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 100-17 supra.
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pression embodied in the first amendment guarantees the right of
unrestricted communication between entities and individuals except in
certain circumstances.190 Only exceptionally may the government re-
strain or mandate the publication of particular information.1 91
An entity that acts as a conduit, rather than as a creator or an
editor of speech, however, may not be acting in ways that the first
amendment protects. 192 As a conduit merely enables others to speak,
some regulation of speech conduits may be permissible under the first
amendment. 93 Cable television systems act more as conduits than do
other communications media. 194 On most channels, the system merely
transmits unedited programs that it receives.' 95 The nature of a cable
system does not require that the owner be given absolute control over
all the programming it presents. Thus, as greater regulation of conduits
may be allowed than is permissible to originators of speech, and as
cable television acts as a conduit, the FCC should be allowed greater
latitude in regulating the operation of cable television.
Another argument for allowing the government wide latitude in
regulating cable is that a cable system is able to operate only by a li-
cense of the local government. As municipalities are not sovereign, but
are merely subdivisions of the state, 196 the granting of a franchise is
actually state action. 97 In granting such a franchise, the state decides
who will be allowed to program, and thus who will be heard. 98 Con-
versely, the state thereby also decides whose speech will not be heard.
As the first amendment prohibits any such state abridgement of free
speech, 199 the franchisee, operating under state authority, cannot com-
plain that its first amendment rights are violated when the federal gov-
ernment, represented by the FCC, requires it to share some
programming space. The Supreme Court has upheld the right of the
FCC to act in this area.2°° Federally required access channels that
190. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (false and misleading commercial
speech); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (time, place and manner restrictions); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libelous words); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
191. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
192. Kreiss, supra note 98, at 1024-25.
193. Id
194. Id at 1026.
195. See note 201 & accompanying text infra.
196. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1977).
197. Cable franchises can also extend beyond municipal boundaries, thus necessitating
state authorization. See W. BAER & M. BOTEIN, CABLE TELEVISION: FRANCHISING CON-
SIDERATIONS 243 (1974).
198. Kreiss, supra note 98, at 1012-13.
199. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1975).
200. Midwest 1, 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwest Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968).
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equalize the benefit of a state or local government decision about who
will speak on cable television thus are not prohibited by the first
amendment.
20'
Imposing mandatory public access obligations on cable operators
in the limited form designed by the FCC does not violate the first or
fifth amendments. The access rules should have been held constitu-
tional because they do not exercise control over content, but simply
regulate a conduit for originators of speech. In addition, it is evident
that the access rules would not have served impermissibly to mandate
the publication or adoption of unwanted views by the cable operator.
The access requirements do more to promote freedom of speech than to
impinge on the freedom of the press.
An Affirmative Right of Access
Scholars have argued that there is a principle embodied in the first
amendment that requires that the public have access to the media and
that this principle takes precedence over the protective first amendment
stance towards the mass media.202 As one commentator has stated:
The most challenging problems in First Amendment theory to-
day lie in the prospect of using law affirmatively to promote more
effective functioning of the system of freedom of expression. The
traditional premises of the system are essentially laissez-faire in char-
acter. . . .Thus the issues have turned for the most part upon rec-
onciling freedom of expression with other social interests that the
government seeks to safeguard. . . .A realistic view of the system
of freedom of expression in this country today, however, discloses
serious deficiencies that call for a different kind of First Amendment
approach.
20 3
Freedom of expression is essential to ensure individual self-fulfillment,
to advance knowledge through open discussion, to provide for deci-
sionmaking by all members of society, and to achieve a more stable




One of the most serious problems stifling freedom of expression is
that the structure and economics of the modern media allow only a few
to enter the communications marketplace.2 0 5 The overpowering mo-
nopoly and concentration of the mass media over the means of commu-
nication have been acknowledged.20 6  As a result, only a few
201. Kreiss, supra note 98, at 1026-30.
202. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
203. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627 (1970).
204. Id at 6-7.
205. SCHMIDT, supra note 158, at 39-40; see, e.g., Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Tele-
communications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 238.
206. "[Mlost citizens in the United States experience monopoly newspapers, a small
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individuals have access to the media, and there exists the potential for
only limited dissemination of ideas and viewpoints. To maintain an
informed citizenry, necessary to intelligent participation in a demo-
cratic society, the public must have access to all shades of opinion.
20 7
To attain a widespread dissemination of ideas, access must be pro-
vided to types of communication that reach a significant number of
people. The effective avenues of communication in modem society are
newspapers of wide circulation, radio, broadcast television, and cable
television 208-the media in which the concentration of ownership is the
greatest.20 9 The monopolization of the market is even greater for cable
systems than for radio or broadcast television because there is usually
only one operator for each service area.210 Thus, a cable operator who
has the power to control all the programming and information content
of the channels on a given system has almost absolute monopoly power
over the cable medium of expression in that locale. 211 Furthermore,
the concentration of ownership within the cable industry and the in-
creasing overlapping ownership of cable systems and other media am-
plify the monopolization of the cable industry.
212
The owners of the media have the opportunity to influence and
manipulate society through their control of access to the means of ex-
pression. Yet often they have no special qualifications.213 The only
requirement for one who speaks through the media is that he or she
have the funds to buy or otherwise to gain access to the media. The
Supreme Court, however, has not looked with favor on a system in
number of television stations that are dominated by network programming, and a larger
number of radio stations broadcasting largely interchangeable programs with a minimum
concern for public affairs." SCHMIDT, supra note 158, at 39; see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 627 (1970); SCHMIDT, supra note 158, at 40-46; Lively, Media
Access and a Free Press, 58 DENVER L.J. 17 n.4 (1980); see also Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-54 (1974).
207. "The theory of free speech is grounded on the belief that people will make the right
choice if presented with all points of view on a controversial issue." Capital Broadcasters v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 590 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J. dissenting); see J. BARRON, FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA 16 (1973) [herein-
after cited as BARRON]; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-28 (1960).
The Sloan Commission recommended that a limit be set "on the number of cable sub-
scribers served nationally by any single individual or corporate enterprise engaged in owner-
ship of cable franchises." SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 175, 148-49. This
recommendation has never been followed. See note 139 & accompanying text supra.
208. Kreiss, supra note 98, at 1010 n.60.
209. See note 144 supra.
210. CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 12
(1974).
211. Id
212. See note 144 supra; see, e.g., 87 F.C.C.2d 587 (1981).
213. BARRON, supra note 207, at 77.
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which wealth determines access to the marketplace of ideas.214
In light of this inequitable access to the media, commentators have
suggested an affirmative interpretation of the first amendment that
guarantees access to the dominant media.21 5 Requiring access rights,
whereby the operators of the media would be required to share access
with those who cannot obtain a chance to speak, would offer the public
the capacity for effective communication to a potentially large audi-
ence.216 As some observers note, owners of the mass media must real-
ize that they do not always depict American society accurately and that
only opposing groups and constituencies can represent the diverse
viewpoints in the country.
21 7
Proponents of access requirements suggest that media operators
will not provide access voluntarily because their purpose is to make a
profit and not to give access to free speech.218 However, "'the First
Amendment acts as a sword as well as a shield,' and . . . it imposes
obligations on the owners of the press in addition to protecting the
press from government regulation. ' '21
9
Most writers who oppose affirmative access rights accept the no-
tion that the first amendment favors diversity of expression. They ar-
gue, however, that access obligations imposed by the government will
chill the free speech rights of cable operators or will expand official
supervision of expression and that either of these effects will serve
eventually to restrict diversity of expression.220 Thus, these writers ar-
gue that autonomy of the press is a basic element of free expression.
The optimal solution to this controversy lies in reconciling the val-
ues of autonomy and diversity. This solution would entail determining
which medium "should be protected from access so that the values of
autonomy can best be preserved. . . and which other [media] should
214. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 123.
215. See note 144 supra; see also BARRON, supra note 207, at 71, 74.
216. "Equality through access would attempt to offset capital investment, skill at com-
munication or distribution, perceptivity, popular acceptance, organizational skills, continu-
ing commitment, hereditary privilege, hard work, charisma, luck and all other economic,
social, and experience-based factors that traditionally determine who has the capability for
effective communication in our society." SCHMIDT, supra note 158, at 18-19.
217. BARRON, supra note 207, at 93.
218. See id at 5.
219. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J.) (quoting
Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)). Associated Press and New York Times have been offered to support the
affirmative access view. Chief Justice Burger also quoted Justice Black's statement in Associ-
ated Press that "[the First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the wel-
fare of the public. ... Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at 20, quoted in Miami
Herald, 418 U.S. at 251-52.
220. SCHMIDT, supra note 158, at 31 (citing Lange, The Role of Access Doctrine in the
Regulation ofthe Mass Media 52 N.C.L. Rav. 1 (1973)).
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be made accessible to serve the goal of diversity. '221 Cable may be the
most effective and practical means of airing public viewpoints.222 The
print and broadcasting media are less suitable to access. The previous
analyses of the differences between cable and traditional broadcasting,
with its one-channel capacity, and between cable and newspapers has
illustrated why autonomy, or at most a limited access, is preferable to
the traditional newsprint and broadcasting media.
223
The Supreme Court has stated that the application of first amend-
ment standards to regulation must be assessed in light of the different
characteristics of the medium involved.224 Radio and television broad-
casters, having the capacity to broadcast only one program at a time,
must be distinguished from cable operators and newspapers having a
much greater capacity to provide access. The scarcity of available
broadcast time on a single-channel station makes it undesirable to im-
pose substantial access rights on traditional broadcasters. Moreover,
the editorial policy, the sources of revenue, and the absence of intrusion
upon the public domain make required access to newspapers undesir-
able.2 2 5 Thus, as cable television provides the relatively more practical
and more effective means of broadcasting diverse public viewpoints,
FCC regulations mandating reasonable public access should be upheld.
An additional reason for allowing the imposition of access rights
on cable television is that the Supreme Court has refused to allow even
broadcasters to monopolize their frequencies because, under the first
amendment, "lilt is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount. '226 Thus, a broadcast licen-
see must provide limited time to others because the scarcity of frequen-
cies means that only a few have the chance to speak over the
airwaves.227 The Supreme Court in Red Lion concluded that the FCC
could obligate broadcasters to act as fiduciaries and present voices and
opinions representative of different viewpoints within the community
that would otherwise never be heard228 This limited right of access,
known as the Fairness Doctrine,229 requires broadcasters to set aside
221. Id at 36.
222. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
223. See notes 76-86, 155-75 & accompanying text supra.
224. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 371, 386-87; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
225. See text accompanying notes 162-75 supra.
226. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 390.
227. Id at 389-90.
228. Id Some commentators advocate abandoning spectrum scarcity as a rationale for
government regulation of broadcasting; see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 699-700 (1978); Bollinger, Freedom ofthe Press and Public 4ccess, 75 MICH. L. Rlv. 1,
13-14 (1976).
229. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976); see 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). For a further policy statement
on the Fairness Doctrine, see In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues Under the
March 1982] CABLE TELEVISION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
reasonable amounts of time for discussion of important public issues
and for presenting opportunities to air contrasting points of view.
230 It
also requires the broadcasters provide time for replies to personal at-
tacks and political editorials that they broadcast.231 Broadcasters, how-
ever, retain complete editorial discretion over the issues, presentations,
and spokespersons. Thus, the broadcast station retains most of its edi-
torial autonomy.232 The Supreme Court, however, refused to expand
access to the broadcast media when in CBS it refused to compel broad-
casters to sell editorial advertising time to the highest bidder.
233
Conventional broadcasting is not the best medium for unlimited
access to public viewpoints. The need to appeal to a mass audience for
advertising revenues, and the possibility that broadcasters might be
drawn away from all controversial discussion because the Fairness
Doctrine would obligate them to present all viewpoints and thus con-
sume more valuable time, are sufficient rationales for giving traditional
broadcasters the autonomy to refuse to air the discussion of controver-
sial issues.
Thus, public access to an effective mass communications medium
is best accomplished on cable television, on which the burdens of
achieving diversity of expression encumber media owners the least.
Proposed Regulation
There should be some requirement that all cable television systems
provide space for public access. As the Supreme Court has stated that
the FCC cannot impose such a requirement, legislation by Congress
would be the remaining vehicle for achieving this goal.
234
An optimal public access law would allow more flexibility than did
the invalidated FCC regulations. 235 An access regulation should re-
quire a minimum amount of access, but, unlike the FCC rules, allow
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
230. 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974).
231. These are the rules that were upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. at 396.
232. A discussion of the many criticisms of the Fairness Doctrine is beyond the scope of
this Comment. See, e.g., GELLER, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING (1973);
SCHMIDT, supra note 158, at 157-82.
233. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See note 68 supra. Some commentators argue that the CBS
decision is based on the fact that the Fairness Doctrine already provided sufficient access to
broadcasting. Kreiss, supra note 98, at 1039 n. 151. If the current attacks on the Fairness
Doctrine result in its repeal, access to cable will be more important than ever. See Broad-
casting, Sept. 21, 1981, at 23.
234. Both the Senate Communications Subcommittee and the House Telecommunica-
tions Subcommittee are considering cable television issues during the 97th Congress, al-
though legislation promoting access seems unlikely. See note 121 supra.
235. See notes 42-48 & accompanying text supra.
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the exact structure of the access, including time and channel allotment,
to be determined by the individual cable system franchise agreement.
This framework would allow a local government to determine the
needs of its community and would allow local authorities to negotiate a
franchise agreement that can best meet those needs. By mandating aminimum standard, however, FCC regulation would require that ac-
cess could not be ignored by local officials or cable operators. At the
same time, any burden on cable operators would be minimized, be-
cause they would not have to adhere to national standards requiring
that a certain number of channels be left open for public access in areas
in which that requirement exceeds the need to provide access channels.
The rights of access seekers also would not be restricted in areas in
which the demand for access exceeds a minimum national standard.
Conclusion
During the 1960's and early 1970's, the Supreme Court seemed to
accept the need to provide access to the mass media. With the CBS,
Miami Herald, and Midwest I1 decisions, however, the Court indicated
that it was not going to provide a broad right of access to cable televi-
sion, at least under current legislation. The Communications Act of
1934 should be amended to provide a right of access to cable. Any
future legislation should require that a minimum of cable's unlimited
channel capacity be left open for public access. The profound social
and political influence of television and cable television calls for a
scheme of regulation that balances the first amendment rights of free-
dom of press and freedom of speech. By providing rights of public
access to cable television, legislation and regulation can help to meet
the goals of the first amendment by ensuring that a diversity of views
can be heard and that a full range of ideas can be explored.
Reasonable access requirements should not be held to violate the
freedom of the press. Cable operators would still be free to voice
whatever views they hold if access requirements are passed. The access
requirements would not regulate the content of programs to be aired.
Furthermore, the government should be allowed a greater degree of
latitude in regulating cable both because it acts principally as a conduit
for communication and because the cable system can operate only
through a government license.
Leaving public access rights to be determined by a struggle be-
tween the local franchising entity and the corporate cable operator in-
adequately serves the public interest. Frequently, the local government
entity is either unprepared to negotiate with a cable operator for access
rights or is ignorant of those rights. In addition, a local governmental
authority may be too willing to forsake rights to public access in ex-
change for a lucrative contract. Although the cable industry should not
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be stifled through burdensome regulation, legislation designed to en-
sure minimum rights of public access to cable should be enacted to
promote the goals of the first amendment.
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